Up until 1913, state legislatures elected Senators. The Founders liked the idea of very definitively representing the interests of states in the federal government. Progressives successfully amended the Constitution to give voters of each state a direct say in their choice of Senators - and the Senate has been rather less sensitive to the interests of their state governments ever since. What was inconceivable in 1787 or 1913 but could be implemented today in the jet age is just giving governors an extra job. What if there was a constitutional amendment that replaced half the Senate with the Governors of our states?
Americans helped write another federalist constitution that does something like this (albeit grounded in its own historical tradition): Germany’s upper house, the Bundesrat, consists of the leaders of each of its states and some local cabinet ministers; each state gets 3-6 votes, ranging on population. Each state’s representatives must vote as a bloc. The Bundesrat has absolute veto power over legislation affecting state administration or finances - about half of all German laws. For other legislation, its veto can be overridden by the German parliament known as the Bundestag. The system has slowed German centralization compared to other European states. Political scientists regard it as a powerful veto player that has repeatedly forced the federal government to bargain, water-down, or abandon initiatives ranging from tax reform to immigration and energy policy. But because German states administer most federal programs, they sometimes insist on higher transfers before giving consent.
If Governors constituted half the Senate, unfunded mandates and attempts to commandeer state governments would dramatically decline. Though we could make voting remote, it would be a stronger constraint on the federal government if the Senate required a substantial quorum: legislation would have to be important enough to justify Governors leaving their states. Due to domestic responsibilities, there’d be little worry about a Governor “going native” in Washington. Because all but one state have some sort of a balanced budget amendment, Governors are used to having to at least go through motions to - and often actually - balance budgets, which would be an extremely valuable skill to contribute to Washington. More broadly, governors bring executive experience and intimate knowledge of implementation and administration challenges that could positively shape legislation. Senators currently also have a tendency to want to do something even if it would be much better for our constitutional order that they did not; Governors would have no such problem: they could always go home and do something, hopefully reorienting the political action back to the states where it was always supposed to be.
For better and worse, the amendment would also force much higher turnover: 3 out of every 4 Governors are subject to term limits. Several states have unlimited campaign contributions which would affect elections. And for those only interested in partisan metrics: Republicans have controlled a majority of Governorships for 60% of the time since 1980 - but have controlled a majority of the Senate for only half the time.
But we really do not know what would happen with such a disruption. For better and worse, the small sample of former governors elected to the Senate since 1980 tend to be more centrist (e.g. Joe Manchin and Mitt Romney, Zell Miller and Lamar Alexander - though the centrist bias is stronger on the Democrat side (yay!) and there are exceptions like fiscal hawk Rick Scott). We don’t know how they would act if they had to occupy both seats at the same time, and power would be really concentrated in individuals. The proposal inherently combines executive and legislative functions and people are not necessarily skilled at both - but it fundamentally preserves (if not enhances) separation of powers. Voters would not be able to easily disentangle federal and state performance. Because Governors would have to be absent to some degree, acting governors would become more powerful; meanwhile, Senate staff might become more powerful while Governors reign at home. Governors may actually spend more federal money to shore up state budgets. Elections to the Senate would be less staggered (currently only 1/3 is elected every two years, but this would concentrate elections further) and therefore subject to timely whims. Unless you required regional quorums, this would empower states closest to Washington (the Governors of Virginia and Maryland could always show up, not so much Alaska and Montana - but maybe California and Oregon are busy, too).
Figure. Huey Long, the Kingfish, provides a leftist counterexample. He even got himself elected to the Senate and continued serving as Governor for several months into his Senate term - though he delayed actually taking the Senate oath.
Of course, the whole idea is unlikely: for a 2/3 vote to pass a constitutional amendment, at least 17 Senators would have to vote to replace themselves! Of course, if it did go to the states for ratification, legislatures might prefer that their Governors spend a bit more time in Washington and quickly vote in favor. Alternatively, instead of replacing half the Senate, what if we added all the Governors? Or, like Germany, gave states a collective veto on laws that would affect them?
Or how about this idea: make each state’s auditor a Senator. To ensure that the office was properly attentive to its fiscal responsibility rather than just being a platform for the Senate, give the auditor in each state an absolute veto over any tax increases by the legislature or local government. That would quickly ensure attentiveness to tax-sensitive voters!